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Two environmental law cases decided in the past year by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit are of major significance. The first,
Scottsdale Mall v. Indiana,' is important at least in part for what it fails to
do. The second, United States Steel Corp. v. Train,2 is a complex case,
important first of all because of its potential impact on pollution in the
environment around Gary, Indiana, and, secondly, because of its detailed
treatment of the issues involved.
SCOTTSDALE MALL V. INDIANA
Scottsdale Mall v. Indiana3 concerned an attempt by Indiana to avoid
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act4 by withdrawing a
highway project from a federal aid program in the final stages of the project.
The project involved the construction of a twenty-eight mile bypass around
the South Bend and Elkhart metropolitan area, originally programmed for
construction in four segments. One segment had been completed using
federal funds. By 1966 the three remaining segments had been scheduled,
programmed and worked upon as a federal project. 5 Location hearings on
the project were held pursuant to federal law.6 The location of the second
(mall) segment was established in 1967.
Prior to February 1975, Indiana had received $162,000 in federal funds
to complete preliminary engineering studies on the project. 7 In 1973, Indi-
ana requested federal authorization to proceed with land acquisition for the
mall segment and was advised that an Environmental Impact Statement' was
required. Indiana then advised the Department of Transportation 9 that the
state would withdraw its application for federal funding of the mall segment.
* Assistant Chief Counsel, Illinois Department of Transportation; Former research
assistant, Washington State Land Planning Commission; Former staff member, Northeastern
Planning Commission; member of the Illinois bar; J.D., Columbia Law School.
1. 549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977).
2. 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
3. 549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text and in footnotes as
NEPA].
5. 549 F.2d at 486.
6. Id. at 487.
7. Id.
8. Hereinafter referred to in the text as EIS.
9. Hereinafter referred to in the text as DOT.
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However, DOT informed Indiana that since all three remaining segments
were part of the same project, an EIS would be required for all of the
segments.
The State of Indiana submitted EIS's for each of the three segments.
They were approved even though the EIS for the mall segment was pro-
cedurally deficient because it was not circulated for public comment pur-
suant to the NEPA 10 and the environmental regulations promulgated under
this Act." Later, however, the Secretary of DOT withdrew approval and
required preparation of a new EIS. As a result, in late 1975, Indiana took
steps to remove all remaining segments of the bypass from federal funding
consideration, and stated that federal funds received for studies on the
project were refunded by an accounting transfer to other federally funded
projects. 12
The district court concluded that since the state had withdrawn the
project and had failed to obtain an EIS at the location stage as required by
section 771.5(b) of the regulations, 3 its eligibility for federal funding was
foreclosed. The district court held that the state's "decision not to comply
with the eligibility procedures necessary to maintain [its] option to receive
federal highway funds cannot have the paradoxical effect of producing
federal involvement."' 4 Consequently, since federal funding was no longer
in question, the federal government could not require compliance with
NEPA.
The circuit court disagreed, holding that the entire project constituted a
"major federal action" for purposes of NEPA and that an EIS was required
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). This section states, in part:
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult
with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such
statements and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local
agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall
be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the
public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through
the existing agency review processes.
Id.
I1. 23 C.F.R. § 771.12(c) (1977). These regulations provide:
The draft EIS shall be circulated by the HA (highway agency) on behalf of FHWA
(Federal Highway Administration) for comment and made available to the public at
least 30 days before the public hearing and no later than the publication of first notice
for the hearing or opportunity therefor.
Id.
12. See 549 F.2d at 487 for a discussion of the state's attempt to withdraw the project.
13. Section 771.5(b) of the regulations states:
In the development of the highway section, the negative declaration or EIS and section
4(f) statements and required processing under 16 U.S.C. 470(f) shall be completed
during the location stage, prior to the selection of a particular location; except for
those highway sections to which this part applies that had received location approval
prior to the effective date of this part.
23 C.F.R. § 771.5(b) (1977).
14. 418 F. Supp. 296, 301 (S.D. Ind. 1976).
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for the remaining three segments.1 5 The court held that Indiana's "seeking
and receiving federal approval at various stages of the project and receiving
preliminary financial benefits so imbued the highway project with a federal
character" that compliance with NEPA was required, notwithstanding with-
drawal of the project from federal funding consideration. 16 The crucial set of
factors was held to be Indiana's actions of seeking federal funding, pro-
gramming the project for federal assistance, seeking and receiving federal
approval of location and design, receiving federal funding for preliminary
engineering, and beginning right-of-way acquisition pursuant to federal
procedures. 
17
The court noted that to hold otherwise would frustrate the congres-
sional directive to administer federal laws and regulations in accordance
with NEPA policies "to the fullest extent possible."' 8 The court specifically
refused to determine "the precise point at which a federally programmed
state highway project becomes irrevocably federal in character for NEPA
purposes."
19
The logic of the major premise of this case cannot survive analysis.
First of all, the EIS is required only in a "recommendation or report on
proposals for . . . major Federal actions .. ."20 NEPA's requirements
are intended to serve as an aid in the federal decision-making process.
21
Therefore, in order for NEPA's requirements to apply, logically there must
still be pending a federal decision on the project. In this case, there was
clearly no longer any possibility of such federal decision.
It is obvious that if the project had been funded totally by the state from
the beginning, NEPA would never have applied, because no federal deci-
sion would have been involved. It is also evident that under applicable
federal regulations, which were not contested in this case, an EIS was not
required for federal funding of any of the preliminary steps in this project.
The EIS was required at the later stage of the project as a prerequisite to
federal consideration of the project for further funding approval. Although
the state had submitted EIS's for the remaining segments, it had chosen, in
effect, to withdraw those EIS's as a basis for federal consideration of the
project. It is not logical to require submission of an EIS for work that has
15. 549 F.2d at 489.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 489-90.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
19. 549 F.2d at 489 (emphasis added).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). See Kieppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); see also
115 CONG. REC. 29051-60, 40415-27, 40923-28 (1969).
21. Brown, Applying NEPA to Joint Federal and Nonfederal Projects, 4 ENV. AFFAIRS
135, 136 (1975).
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been removed from federal consideration for funding for further work.
Submission of an EIS is expensive and time-consuming. Where federal
funds are no longer contemplated, such a requirement can only be intended
to serve a punitive function. Even if one does not sympathize with the
decision of Indiana to withdraw from federal funding to avoid further public
controversy and expense, such withdrawal is certainly permitted, as noted
by the district court in this case.22 A circuit court slap on the wrist for
exercising the prerogative is hardly warranted.
Scottsdale is clearly distinguishable from the line of cases that has
raised the issue of when, in a project that is to be federally funded, the EIS
must first be prepared. For example, in Silva v. Romney, 23 the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that a district court had the authority to
enjoin a developer from continuing work on a housing project pending the
outcome of an EIS by the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment.24 The district court was so empowered because the nexus between
the developer and HUD, which was financing the project, was so extensive
that the developer was "in partnership," 25 in effect, with the federal
government. However, there was no challenge in Silva to the legitimacy of
the EIS demand, nor was there any attempt by the developer to withdraw
from federal funding.
Again, in Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy
Commission,26 there was no question of continuing federal funding. Plain-
tiffs sought declaratory relief against the Atomic Energy Commission's
27
Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program28 pending the issuance by the
AEC of a detailed statement about the program. The court held that the
nature of the program demanded the immediate submission of such a report.
The AEC conceded the necessity of an EIS for each particular facility
contemplated by the LMFBR program and questioned only the requirement
of an immediate report on the entire program. This was clearly not a case in
which federal funding had been, or would be, terminated.
Indiana Lookout Alliance v. Volpe 29 is also distinguishable. That case
concerned an extensive Iowa highway construction program, one seven mile
segment of which was to be federally funded. While the court held that
portions of the highway construction beyond the seven mile segment could
22. See 549 F.2d at 488 for a discussion of the district court opinion.
23. 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973).
24. Hereinafter referred to in the text as HUD.
25. 473 F.2d at 290.
26. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
27. Hereinafter referred to in the text as AEC.
28. Hereinafter referred to in the text as LMFBR.
29. 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973).
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require the issuance of an EIS, the decision rested upon the court's assump-
tion that Iowa desired to keep open its options to secure federal funds and
would apply for such funds as its construction program progressed.3 ° By
contrast, the Indiana State Highway Commission in Scottsdale clearly
indicated it no longer desired federal assistance.
Likewise, Scottsdale is distinguishable from San Antonio Conserva-
tion Society v. Texas Highway Department3 in which the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit enjoined construction of a federal-aid highway until the
Secretary of DOT completed an environmental impact report. In that case,
Texas argued that the court had no power to compel the state to comply with
federal law because Texas was determined to complete the project with its
own funds, if necessary. This argument failed to persuade the court that the
highway was not a federal project subject to federal law. However, unlike
Indiana in the Scottsdale case, Texas believed itself eligible for federal
funds, had requested participation in a federal-funding program and had no
present intention of withdrawing its application.32 In Scottsdale, by
contrast, further federal approval had been rendered moot and, therefore, all
NEPA requirements likewise should have been held moot.
In Scottsdale, the Seventh Circuit was apparently so interested in
punishing Indiana for avoiding compliance with the NEPA that it failed to
recognize that there was no longer a function to be served by an EIS in that
case. The district court's decision was correct and should not have been
reversed.
UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. V. TRAIN
United States Steel Corp. v. Train33 concerned the granting of an
Environmental Protection Agency 34 discharge permit for United States Steel
Corporation's Gary Works, pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. 35 Under the FWPCA, discharge of any pollutant by any person is
prohibited, except as specifically permitted by administrative action pur-
suant to the Act. 36 An existing source, such as the Gary Works, could obtain
permission to discharge a pollutant by applying for a National Pollutant
30. Id. at 16.
31. 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
32. 549 F.2d at 489.
33. 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
34. Hereinafter referred to in the text as EPA.
35. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter referred to in the text as
FWPCA]. Section 1342(a)(1) provides, in part, "the Administrator may, after opportunity for
public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant. ... 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)
(Supp. IV 1974).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
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Discharge Elimination System 37 permit.3 8
The Gary Works had obtained a permit that included both federal and
state restrictions on the discharge of pollutants at each plant. Federal
technology-based effluent limitations were set in two stages: "best practical
control technology currently available," 39 to be met by July 1, 1977;10 and
"best available technology economically achievable," to be met by July 1,
1983. 41 More stringent state limitations were also provided.4 2 The U.S.
Steel case concerned 1977 state and federal limitations.
The Gary Works was constructed on a massive landfill in Lake Michi-
gan as the world's largest steel mill.4 3 Before the Gary Works and other
large industrial plants were built in the Calumet region, the Gary beach was
the center of a major fishing industry." Since being built, however, the
Gary Works has discharged such great amounts of chemical effluents into
the Grand Calumet that fish habitat has collapsed, the downstream river
bottom has become composed of minute iron particles and the river has
become completely unfit for any type of recreation.4 5 Over a ton of cyanide
is discharged daily into the river. In fact, the Gary Works has been the single
largest polluter of Lake Michigan for decades, 46 and the Public Health
Service has charged that the Gary Works is contributing to a practically
irreversible pollution of the Lake.47 Nonetheless, past attempts to enact and
enforce adequate controls on pollution by the Works have been frustrated
consistently .48
At trial, U.S. Steel raised a series of-objections when confronted with
charges that it violated EPA permit conditions. First, the company con-
tended that the EPA Administrator was required in the permit hearing to
determine the validity of Indiana's water quality standards, since no judicial
review was provided for by Indiana.4 9 The court disagreed and held that
under the FWPCA, state limitations supersede less stringent federal limita-
tions, and that the Administrator had already, in a separate proceeding,
considered and approved the applicable Indiana water quality standards50 as
37. Hereinafter referred to in the text as NPDES.
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. IV 1974).
39. Hereinafter referred to in the text as BPT.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter referred to in the text as BAT].
42. 556 F.2d at 837-38.
43. Greer, Obstacles to Taming Corporate Polluters: Water Pollution Politics in Gary,
Indiana, 3 ENV. AFFAIRS 199, 200 (1974).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 200-01.
46. Id. at 201.
47. Id. at 202.
48. Id. at 199-211.
49. 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 1(b)(1)(C), 131 1(b)(2), 1316(d), 1370 (Supp. IV 1974)).
50. 40 C.F.R. § 120.10 (1976) (promulgated pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. IV 1974)).
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consistent with the FWPCA. The Administrator's approval could have been
challenged in this case, but the court held that U.S. Steel's claim in this
regard failed to allege any incompatibility with federal law and was, there-
fore, insufficient in law.
5 1
Second, U.S. Steel alleged that the state's limitations on certain chem-
icals were impossible to achieve given present technology. The court re-
sponded by finding that even if this were true, it did not follow that the
limitations were invalid, because the legislature intended that states be free
to force technology, even at the cost of economic and social dislocations
caused by plant closings. 52 The court also rejected the company's claim that
both the state's chemical and thermal limitations were arbitrary, because,
under the FWPCA, the Administrator had no authority to question either the
necessity of the limitations or the validity of the standards which the
limitations were intended to achieve.
53
Third, the company argued that technology-based limitations on Gary
Works outfalls should be no more stringent than past operating levels. The
EPA contended that in some instances past operations did not reflect careful
and efficient operation required under NPDES, so that it was appropriate to
disregard extremely high discharge values in monitoring data. The court
found that the EPA's method of analysis was acceptable and that the EPA is
entitled to use its expertise on the subject in judging reliability or representa-
tiveness of data.54 In addition, the court found that to use limitations based
on past operations might include "a factor for human or mechanical lapses
that should not be tolerated." 55 Although the limits proposed by U.S. Steel
would actually have allowed an increase in pollutant discharge, the
company argued that this was justified because their proposal was actually
consistent with EPA's guidelines for the steel industry. The court held that
EPA's guidelines had not been shown to be anything other than a rough
approximation, subject to modification based on performance data in setting
actual limitations. 56
Concerning surface runoff, the court held that it had not been deter-
mined what effect surface runoff would have on discharge levels and
treatment facilities. Consequently, the court would not accept U.S. Steel's
argument that surface runoff would increase the concentration of total
51. 556 F.2d at 837. The state regulations may still be contested on federal constitutional
grounds in a federal suit against the state in a district court where jurisdiction and venue are
proper.
52. Id. at 838.
53. Id. at 839.
54. Id. at 842.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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suspended solids57 and should be exempted.5"
Fourth, the company challenged the EPA's conclusion that recycling
constituted BPT for the iron-making blast furnaces at the Gary, Works on
three grounds:
(1) EPA failed to consider the six factors set forth in § 304(b)(l)(B)
as 'relating to the assessment of[BPT],'and therefore the agency's
designation or recycling as BPT was improper. (2) Installation of a
recycling system would cause violations of the sulphate limits in
the permit, and therefore recycling is not a 'practicable' technol-
ogy for Gary Works. (3) A recycling system cannot be built and
placed in operation at Gary Works before July 1, 1977, and there-
fore is not 'currently available' to U.S. Steel.59
On the first ground, that the EPA's designation of recycling as BPT
was improper, the court held that technology-based effluent limitations,
guidelines and BPT are uniform national standards and are not to vary from
plant to plant.' Since the BPT for this category and class of point source
had already been determined on a nationwide basis and constituted a proper
basis for establishing the TSS limitations for the Gary Works permit, the
EPA was not required to consider the six section 304(b)(1)(B) factors again
in its permit proceeding. 61 The EPA could have considered, however,
whether a variance from the national standards was warranted under the
United States Supreme Court's holding in DuPont v. Train.62 The court
found, in fact, that this is basically what the EPA did in the permit
proceeding, and that the EPA had implicitly concluded that a variance was
not in order. 63 The court reviewed that conclusion and determined that it was
reasonable to determine that any necessary retrofitting to provide recycling
in the older blast furnaces was feasible in light of similar retrofitting at other
plants. 64
The court, in deciding the company's second contention that recycling
is not practicable technology for the Gary Works, said that the TSS limita-
tions based on recycling as BPT were not rendered unacceptable because of
the resulting potential violation of state permit limitations. 65 U.S. Steel
asserted that no technology was known that would allow it to decrease
sulphate discharges to a level allowed by state sulphate limitations. 66 The
57. Hereinafter referred to in the text as TSS.
58. 556 F.2d at 843.
59. Id. at 844.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977).
63. 556 F.2d at 845.
64. Id. at 846.
65. Id. at 847.
66. Id. at 846.
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court held that recycling as BPT was not thereby rendered impractical and
that neither was a variance justified. It was found that to consider more
stringent state limitations as a factor in determining whether to grant a
variance would permit strict state limitations to create a loophole for avoid-
ing compliance with federal standards. 67 To do so would frustrate legislative
intent because "[an important reason for Congress' adoption of nationally
applicable federal effluent limitations was to prevent individual states from
attracting industry by adopting permissive water quality standards." 68
U.S. Steel's third contention, that there was not time to construct and
put in operation the recycling system, was held to have no merit, on the
grounds that there was time to do so when the permit was first issued, and
"litigation . . .seeking a variance from national standards . . . is carried
out on the polluter's time, not the public's .... "69 In addition, the court
stated: "Temporal feasibility of BPT installation is not included in the §
304(b) factors and should not be a ground for a variance. Consideration of
that factor would emasculate the mandatory nature of the July 1, 1977
compliance deadline. "
70
The EPA permit involved requiring U.S. Steel to conduct a monitoring
program, study the environmental impact of the cooling-water intakes for
the Works and submit a proposal for meeting the section 316(b) require-
ments that "the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling
water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact." '7 1 The court held that this requirement
applies on its face to all technology-based effluent limitations applicable to a
point source and is intended to be implemented through sections 30172 and
30673 standards. 74 The study was held to be well within the EPA's au-
thority.
75
U.S. Steel also challenged the EPA's legal authority to impose effluent
limitations and study and monitoring requirements on the company's dis-
charges of acid wastes into a deep well. The court rejected this challenge 76
because the EPA's permit program is subject to the same requirements as
apply to a state permit program, 77 and the EPA requires that state permit
67. Id. at 847.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 92 (1975)).
70. 556 F.2d at 847.
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. IV 1974).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. IV 1974).
74. 556 F.2d at 849-50.
75. Id. at 850.
76. Id. at 851-52.
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1974).
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programs cover disposal of pollutants into wells.78 The court supported this
interpretation 79 by reference to general provisions and definitions of the
FWPCA,8 ° and to the legislative history of the FWPCA. s'
Further, the permit's schedules of compliance were attacked by U.S.
Steel as arbitrary. This argument was summarily rejected by the court.82 The
company argued that the EPA's delay in promulgating national effluent
guidelines entitled the company to an extension of the July 1, 1977, deadline
for BPT-based effluent limitations. The court held that the inclusion of past
dates in the EPA compliance schedule did not prejudice U.S. Steel because
the EPA indicated that it would not prosecute for noncompliance therewith.
Consequently, invalidation of the entire schedule was not necessary.83 The
court also held that the mandatory nature of the statutory deadline precluded
an extension, and that permit requirements properly imposed are enforce-
able by the statutory timetable whether or not they are based on national
guidelines.
84
The United States Steel case points out several troublesome aspects of
the FWPCA. If effluent limitations imposed by states are truly impossible to
achieve by the specified time, then it is little comfort to the polluter and to
others put out of work or out of business that the state was intended to be
free to force technology. Even if such unattainable state requirements were
to be later modified, the economic dislocation would still have taken place,
with potentially drastic and long-term effects on people and the economy.
If, instead of closing a plant, the EPA were to impose a fine, even this
would amount to imposing an inequitable burden on the industry as a result
of impossible requirements. "Forcing" technology amounts to an attempt to
predict the unpredictable and can amount to a misguided attempt to prevent
malingering by industrial polluters. Such an approach can ultimately lead to
limitations that are simply not enforced-a very real possibility in a commu-
nity where the polluter is a major source, if not the primary source, of local
income.
A related problem is that state and federal requirements may not be
compatible in light of reasonably foreseeable technology. For example, if
U.S. Steel were accurate in stating that it simply would not be able to
recycle and meet sulphate limitations by the time specified, then this
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 1974).
79. See 556 F.2d at 852 for a discussion of the court's interpretation of the legislative
history of the FWPCA.
80. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), 1362(6)(B) (Supp. IV 1974).
81. 556 F.2d at 852-53.
82. Id. at 853.
83. Id. at 854.
84. Id.
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incompatibility of NPDES components should have been precluded or the
variance should have been granted. If impossibility of compliance is the
problem, then some means of lessening the incompatibility should be
provided. Past pollution by U.S. Steel and other major industries would not
justify unreasonable current effluent requirements, and incremental progress
is certainly better than none at all.
Even with these reservations, however, the United States Steel deci-
sion comes as somewhat of a milestone in the long struggle to repair the
damage to the nation's waters. Although the Seventh Circuit's approach in
this case is not without its problems, overall it is the correct approach.
CONCLUSION
The contrast between the quality of the Scottsdale Mall case and that of
the U.S. Steel decision is striking. This contrast leads one to question
whether the strength of the latter and the weakness of the former are due to:
(1) authorship by different judges;85 (2) the fact that NEPA is a relatively
broad and general piece of legislation, while the FWPCA is relatively
specific in relevant areas and thus forces solutions to such problems; or (3) a
desire of the Seventh Circuit bench to achieve the respective results. The
Scottsdale Mall case, for all its recitation of dates, figures, and facts, is a
superficial and inappropriate decision. By comparison, the lengthy U.S.
Steel decision is notably logical and consistent.
85. The Scottsdale Mall case was heard by Judges Pell and Bauer, of the Seventh Circuit,
and Judge Campbell, of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
while United States Steel v. Train was decided by Judges Cummings and Tone, of the Seventh
Circuit and Judge Campbell, of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.
